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The issue  of intra-household  inequality  has received  increasing
attention  over the  past  decade. A number  of authors  (e.g.  Sen, 1984)  have
argued  that  resources  within  the  household  are  not  distributed  according  to
need,  and this  has led  to  attempts  by others  to  model  intra-household
allocative  behavior  (see,  for  example,  the  discussion  in the  recent  survey  by
Behrman  and  Deolalikar,  1989).  The  question  of  what  happens  to intra-
household  inequality  when total  household  resources  increase  has  been raised
by Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990c). They  argue,  on the  basis  of empirical  evidence
on calorie  adequacy  from the  Philippines,  that  as  households  become  better
off,  intra-household  inequality  first  increases  and  then  decreases  - in other
words,  there  appears  to  be an intra-household  Kuznets  curve. The  behavior  of
intra-household  inequality  as the  household  becomes  better  off is clearly
important  for  policy,  since  interventions  are  often  restricted  to the
household  level  while  the  objective  is to improve  the  welfare  of the least
well off individuals. It is also important  as a reduced  form  test  of
alternative  models  of intra-household  allocation.
It turns  out  that  many of the  tractable  derivations  of the  reduced  form
relationship  between  intra-household  inequality  and  total  household  resources,
and indeed  many of the  other  tractable  implications  of intra-household
allocation,  are only  available  in  what might  be described  broadly  as the
"linear  expenditure  systems"  framework. The  objective  of this  paper is to lay
out  a generic  analysis  in this  framework,  and  to show  how a number  of
formulations  of intra-household  allocation  essentially  lead to  special  cases-2-
of the  framework. This includes  (i)  household  welfare  maximization,  (ii)
intra-household  allocation  viewed  as the  outcome  of a Nash co-operative
bargain  and (iii)  intra-household  allocation  as a  Nash non-cooperative  game,
with children  as public  goods.  Each  of these  structural  models  has been
suggested  as an explanation  for intra-household  allocation. We start,
however,  by setting  out the  framework  of linear  expenditure  systems.
2.  Linear  Expenditure  Systems  and  the  Behavior  of Intra-household  Ineauality
We will conduct  the  discussion  in terms  of a  variable  x that  depicts
total  household  resources. The index  i  - 1, 2,...,  n will identify  each of
the  n individuals  in a  household,  so that  xL is  the flow  of resources  to the
n
ith  individual,  and  =  xi= x. At this  level  of generality  x can  hava several
1-1
interpretations.  The most  convenient  way is  perhaps  to think  of it Is  some
measure  of  welfare. More concretely,  it can  be thought  of as calorie  intake
relative  to requirement  (as  in  Haddad  and  Kanbur,  1990a,c). Our focus  is on
how the allocation xi (i - 1, 2, ... ,  n) changes with x.  In reduced form, we
can  write
(1)  x.  x (x)  ;' 1,  2,  .. ,n
as the  functional  relationship  derived  from  the  structural  model  of intra-
household  allocation. A measure  of inequality  of the  intra-household
allocation  can then  be written  as-3-
(2)  I  I(xl  X),  X2 (x)  . X  X.*(X))
Given  the  reduced  form  (1),  we  can  therefore  derive  the  relationship  between
intra-household  inequality  and  total  household  resources.
Consider  the  following  special  case  of  (1):
(3)  XL  -x  iF  aL(x  - Ej);  I  - 1,  2,  .............. , n
i-1
L >  0  V,
E aL  - 1
La'.
In  the  next  two  sections  we  will  discuss  structural  models  that  lead  to  th.
reduced  form. For  now,  notice  that  (3)  is  nothing  but  a  linear  expenditure
system  for  the  n "commodities"  i  - 1,  2,  ... ,  n,  with  intercepts  9L,total
expenditure  x,  super-numerary  expenditure  x  - E  -j,  and  marginal  propensity  to
spend  on  commodity  i  given  by  x.. How  does  intra-household  inequality  behave
as  total  household  resources  change  in  this  framework?
Before  answering  this  question  let  us  rewrite.4-
(4)  x'(ii  - a.  r)  alx
- (XL  stg) +  6&x
P't  +  cgj
where  Ea  is
PL  CL  -
- 0
The share  of  xL  Ln x, 
8L is  given  by
(5)  SL ,  i  *nL +  PLX-I
Thus  the  squared  coefficient  of  variation  of  xL,  which  is  the  same  as  the
variance  cf  s&,  is  given  by
(6)  o.2 o.2  +  2a.  x-l  +  4xF-2
where  o2,  o2 and  oa are  the  variancea  of  the  subscripted  variables,  and .p  is
the  covariance  of a and P.-5-
We  will  focus  on  a!  as  our  measure  of  intra-household  inequality.  We
are interested  in its  behavior  as a function  of x.  It is easily  shown  that
this  function  has  a  unique  minimum  at
x  -- ¢
gap
Of course,  the  economically  relevant  range  for  x is x 2  X->  0.  Thus if ogp  a  0
then dX  < ° for  all  x in  the  relevant  range,  as  shown  in  figure  1. If  a.p  <
O then  there  are  two  cases  to  consider.  If  x  a  x >  O i.e.  if asp  s  , then  doi >  0
for  x  >  x, as  shown  in  figure  2. But  if  x-  >  x  i.e.  if  0  >  xp  >  X ,  then  a2
follows  a  U-shape  in  the  relevant  range  of  x  >,  as  shown  in  figure  3.
Translating  these  conditions  on  aL  and  PL into  conditions  of  £L  and  xi,
after  making  the  normalization  assumption  that  ix 1,  we  get  the  following,
complete,  characterization:
(7a)  o2 _<  vX>x
(7b)  o2-  5g  0,.  <o2  MO do! > O  v x  > xF
dx-
(7c)  ag*  < Min  (o.,  4)  -dx-  has  a  U shape  in  the  range  x  >  x
Figures  4a  and  4b  characterize  the  different  ranges  of a,;  for  the  cases
where  o < a2^  and  where  og  > o..-6-
The behavior  of intra-household  inequality  in a linear  expenliture
system  framework  depends,  therefore,  on the  pattern  of covariance  between  the
parameters  xjl  and  al  of the  system. But  we already  have an important  result
in (7).  Notice  that in  no circumstances  can  the linear  expenditure  system
generate  the invers-'  U shape  of the  Kuznets  curve,  for  which  there  is some
evidence  in the  data (Haddad  and  Kanbur,  1990c). This  would  seem  to  be a
strong  argument  against  models  of intra-household  allocation  that  lead  to a
linear  expenditure  system  as a reduced  form.  The  next two  sections  consider
some  applications  of this  general  characterization.
3.  Two simple  a2plications
3.1  Household  Welfare  Maximization
Suppose  that  the intra-household  allocaticn  (1)  is the  result  of the
maximization  of a  household  welfare  function:
(8)  max  W(xC,  x2, ...I,Xa)
x1 I 2 .. ,  X,,
n
S. t.  X  3  X
L-1
If the  welfare  function  were specialized  to the following  case  of the  Stone-
Geary  utility  function,-7
(9)  W(X,  X2,  ....  ,X)  a  ln  (x  - xj)  ; x  > 0  VI
L- 1.
then it is  well known  that  the  optimal  solution  to (8)  is  exactly  as given  by
(3).
Hence  the  behavior  of intra-household  inequality  is determined  by the
pattern  oA the  minimum  consumption  levels  il  and  the  weights  at  given  to tne
individuals  in the  welfare  function. If,  for  example,  Xi  and  aL  are
negatively  correlated  then  case (7c)  obtains  and  intra-household  inequality
follows  a U shape,  not the inverse-U  shape  of the  Kuznets  curve  that is found
empirically  by Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990c). If,  on the  ot;er  hand,  all aL  are
the  same,  then  case (7a)  obtains  and inequality  decreases  continously. If a;.
is positive,  case (7c)  may still  ebtain, rovided  the  covariance  between  ixand
a  is  not too  high.  If a;.  is  high enough,  in  particular  if it is higher  than
a!,  then  intra-household  inequality  will decrease  as the  household's  resources
increase.
3.2  Two Person  Nash Co-operative  Bgrgaining
Haddad  and  Kanbur (1990b)  have investigated  the  behavior  of intra-
household  inequality  for  a two  person  household  where  allocations  are
determined  as outcomes  to a Nash  bargain. As is  well  known,  if we specify  the
total  resources  being  bargained  over  as x, the  threat  points  of the two
individuals  as xl,  and x2,  and  their  "bargaining  strength"  parameters  as a,,-8-
and aa  (a,  +  a2  - 1),  then the  Nash solution  to the  co-operative  bargain  iB
given  as the  solution  to the following  problem:
(10)  Max  (X 1 - jI)  1  (X2 -
X 1 ,  X2
s.t. x1 +  x2 - x
But  a logarithmic  transform  of the  maximand  Li (10)  gives  us (9)  for  n - 2 and
hence (3)  as the  solution  with n - 2.
We are  back,  therefore,  to the  results  in (7)  for  tbq  case  of n - 2,
which  we have already  discussee  in section  3.1. The two  person  Nash
bargaining  model  with fixed  xl,  ij,  a-  and a 2 leads  to  one of the  three
patterns  for intra-household  inequality,  shown  in (7a),  (7b)  and  I/c),  as
total  household  resources  increase. In the  symmetric  bargaining  model,  with
al  - a2.  we have a- - o2  0  and therefore  case (7a) --  inequality  decreases
continuously. Since  none of these  outcomes  is like  the  Kuznets  curve  observed
in  the data (Haddad  and  Kanbur,  1990c),  this  model  will  have to  be modified.
Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990b)  consider  endogenizing  x,  and xi  as x changes  and
find  that,  under  certain  conditions,  intra-household  inequality  does  indeed
follow  a Kuznets  curve.
4.  A Further  ARDlication:  Children  as Public  Goods
The two  person  Nash  bargaining  framework  is clearly  inappropriate  when
there  are children  involved,  unless  we assume  that  the  welfare  of children  is
subsumed  under the  objective  function  of one  of the  two  players. When-9-
children  are present,  one  way of modelling  their  role  in the  household  is as
public  goods,  from  which  dults  gst  utility  but towards  the  maintenance  of
which each  adult  makes  a voluntary  contribution.  This  perspective,  which is
reflecte6,  for  example,  in the  policy  debate  on  whe-her  welfare  payments
intended  for  children  should  be given  through  the  father  or the  mother,  leads
to a model  of non-cooperative  Nash  equilibrium  between  the  players,  in a game
over  contributions  for  child  up-keep. What  are the  implications  oL  this  mo -l
for  intra-household  inequality?
Consider  the  case  where there  are  two  adults,  indexed  1  and 2, and a
child,  indexed  3.  The consumptions  of the  three  indivi,  '..is  are  x ,  x2, and
X 3. The  two  adults  Lave individual  resources  Yi  and  Y2, which  they  decide  to
split  between  own  consumptions,  xL,  and  contributions  to the  child's
consumption,  c.. Clearly,  Cl  +  C2 - X 3 . The  child's  consumption  is a  public
goocA,  i.e.  X3 enters  both adults'  utility  functions  (along  with their  own
respective  zonsumptions).  Each adult  decides  on his  or  her contribution
child  consumption  conditional  upon the  oth,r  adults'  contribution.
Let adult  i's  utility  function  be given  by
(11)  UL  =  yLln  (xL  - m)  +  (1  - y1)ln(c,  +  C2  - X3)  i  - 1,2
This is a Stone-Geary  from  with minimum  consumptions  for  the  adult  ar.A  m3 for
the  child.  The  weights  on the  contribution  of own  consumption  and child- 10  -
consumption  (after  logarithmic  transformation)  are  y1 and (1 - yi). For
simplicity,  we assuAme  that  neither  adult's  own  consumption  affects  the  other's
utility. The two  adults  solve  the  problems:
(12)  Max  Y1ln (xl  - mi)  +  (1  - YL)ln(ci  +  cj  -3)
xi.,  CL
s.t.  XI  +  CL  yJ
i  - 1,2  ;  j  1  1  if i  - 2
2 if i - 1
This leads  to the  following  solutions  for  i  1,  2
(13a)  xi  =m  + Yi [Y1 - (mF  +  h3 -c 2)]
(13b)  cl =  [m3 - c 2 1 +  (1 - yl) 1 71 - (El  +  E3 - c2 )]
(14a)  X 2 - F2  +  y2 1Y2 - (A2 +  E3  - C1) 
(14b)  C2  a  PT3  - Cl]  + (1 - Y2)[Y 2 - (O2  i o3  - cl)]
A number  of authors  have considered  the  utility  function  (11)  for  public
goods  games  (e.g.  Ulph,  1988  and  Woolley,  1988)  and  have derived  the  Nash
equilibrium  solution  to cl  and  c2. Solving  for  cl  and  c2 simultaneously  in
(13b)  and (14b),  we get the  following  as interior  solutions  to the  Nash game:- 11  -
(15)  Cl.  =  (1  - Y)V  - yl(l  - Y2)Y2  +  Y1(l  y 2)x 3 - (1  - YORxl  +  yl(l  - Y2)R2
(15)  ~~~~~~~~~~~1  - YlY2
(16)  c  =  (1  - Y2)72  - Y2 ('  - Y071  +  Y2 (l  - Y1)g3  - (1  - Y2)R2  +  Y2 (l  - YOKI
1  - Y1Y2
Using these  in (13a)  and (14a),  and  noting  that  X 3 C 1 +  C2,  we have  a
complete  characterization  of consumption  allocation  in  the interior  Nash
equilibrium:
(17)  - + Y2)  +  (1  - y1)H1  - y 1 l  - Y2)ffi2  - y1(l  -Y 2)ffi
=2(l  - Y1)(Y1  +  y2 )  +  (1  - y2)fi2  iy 2 (1  - yd)iF  - y2 (l  - Y053
,,(1  -y 1 )(l  - Y2)(Yl  + Y2)  +  [y1(l  - Y 2)  + y2(l  - y 1)]fi - (1  - y1 )(l  - y2)(il  mii)
1  - Y1Y2
It  will be seen  that  the  equations  in (17)  are in fact in the  form  of a
linear  expenditure  system. If we define  the  following:
(18)  x  Y 1 +  Y2
a  Y,(  - Y2)  a2  Y2(1  - YI)  (1C3  - Yl)  (I  - Y2)
al  =1  -YlY2  ;  1-Y1Y2  ;  3=  1-YIY2
61  k2  - M2  R3  31  -)l  - X 2 3
then it is seen that (17)  is  nothing  other  than (3)  for  i  - 1,  2,  3.  Thus  the
reduced  form  of the  children  as a  public  goods  model  of intra-household- 12 -
allocation,  where  preferences  of adults  as between  own consumption  and  child's
consumption  are  given  by Stone-Geary  utility  functions,  leads  once again  to
the  linear  expenditure  system.
Equations  (17)  and (18)  can  be used  to discuss  intra-household
inequality  in this  model. Notice  first  of all  that  the  allocation  depends
only  on x - y,  +  Y2, i.e.  on total  household  resources. The  division  of
income  does  not  matter. This is a strong  result  which  has immediate  policy
implications. It suggests  that,  in  this  framework,  the  policy  debate  on
targeting  of child  payments  to the  mother  or the  father  is irrelevant  - the
Dublic  goods  game serves  as a perfect  aggregator  and  what  matters  is the  total
level  of resources.
As discussed  by Bergstrom  and  Varian  (1985),  the  above  is a general
result  for  public  goods,  and  does  not  depend  on the  Stone-Geary  utility
function. However,  what the linear  expenditure  specialization  allows  us to do
is to  consider  explicitly  the  behavior  of inequality  as a function  of total
household  resources. We know  from the  discussion  in section  3 that  only  one
of three  outcomes  is  possible  - inequality  always  increasing,  inequality
always  decreasing,  or a U shape  where  inequality  first  decreases  and  then
increases. To the  extent  that  the  empirical  evidence  points  to an inverse  - U
shape  where  inequality  first  increases  and  then  decreases,  this is  an argument
against  the  children  as a public  goods  model  - at least  against  the interior
Nash equilibrium  solution  of this  model.
Consider  now  possible  corner  solutions. Following  Woolley  (1988)
consider  the  case  where  one  adult,  say  adult  2, is  constrained  to set  c2 - 0.
Using  this in (13)  and (14)  we get  the  following  allocation  as solution:- 13  -
(19a)  x1 i,m  + Yf  17Y  - (mi  + mg)]
(19b)  X2  72
(19c)  X3 -m3  +  (1  - Y 1)[y7  - (mix  + 53)]
It is seen immediately  that  the  distribution  of total  household  resources
between  the  adults  now  does  affect  the  intra-household  allocation. Most
particularly,  increases  in  y,  increase  xl  and  X3 ,  but increases  in  Y2  only
increase  x 2. If we think  of individual  2 as  being  the  male  adult,  this  model
does  provide  a rationalization  of targeting  extra  resources  to the  female,
since  at least  some  of these  will  get  to the  child.
The allocation  in (19)  allows  a richer  variety  of shapes  in the
relationship  between  intra-household  inequality  and total  household  resources.
but it  depends  on how exactly  the  increase  in resources  is  divided  between  y1
and  y2. If increments  are distributed  in  constant  proportion,  so that  y1 - ax
and y2 - (1 - 8)x, then we get the allocation
(20)  xI  =  (1  - Y053.  - y1mi + y18x
X2  =  (1  - 8)x
X3  - Ylm3  - (1  - YO)Hl  +  a('  - YO)X- 14 -
This is,  of course,  another  linear  expenditure  system,  so that  a similar
characterization  to the  one in (7)  obtains. The  only  chance  for  a variation
is if after  a  certain  level  of x the interior  solution  comes  into  play.  This
switch  in  regimes  between  two  different  linear  expenditure  systems  can lead  to
a  richer  pattern  of  behavior.
If the increment  in  x comes  solely  from  Y2 (say,  male income)  then  the
behavior  depends  on the  position  of x2 relative  to x1 and  X3 . If x2 is  already
greater  than  xl  and  X3,  the  inequality  will increase  inexorably. Consider  now
the  case  where  x increases  through  increases  in  y1 (female  income). Unit
increments  in this  are divided  according  as y,  to  x1 and (1 - y1) to  X3. In
this  case  both x,  and  X3 will  increase  relative  to  x2. Thus  inequality  will
decrease. It should  then  be clear  that  if initial  increments  to  household
resources  go to the  male, and  subsequent  increments  to the  female,  then  we
will indeed  get the  Kuznets  relationship  of inequality  first  increasing  and
then  decreasing  as total  household  resources  increase.
5.  Conclusion: The  Need for  Non-Linear  Extensions
We have  seen that  models  of intra-household  allocation  that  lead  to
linear  expenditure  system  allocations  imply  very specific  relationships
between  intra-household  inequality  and total  household  resources. We have
derived  these  relationships  and  have argued  that  they  can  be used as reduced
form  tests  of particular  models. Of course,  this  procedure  has  well known
problems,  but it is  hoped that  this  way of proceeding  will  give  guidance  on
how the  structural  models  should  be modified. The  essential  message  is that- 15  -
they  have to be modified  so as to  make intra-household  allocation  non-linear
in total  household  resources:
(i)  In the  household  welfare  maximization  models  it  means  using  utility
functions  that  are  more general  than  the  Stone-Geary  form.  It should  be
noted,  however,  that  most generalizations  of demand  systems  in the income
dimension  essentially  involve  introducing  the  logarithm  of income  as an
independent  variable. This monotonic  transformation  will  not of course  affect
our  conclusions  on the shaRe  of the  relationship  between  intra-household
inequality  and  total  household  resources. In any  event,  most attention  in
generalized  demand  systems  is given  to the  cross-price  effects  (e.g.  the
Almost  Ideal  Demand  System  of Deaton  and  Muellbauer,  1980)  across  commodities,
an issue  which  is not relevant  to the  models  developed  here.
(ii)  In the  Nash co-operative  bargaining  models,  the  modifications  must
involve  endogenizing  the  threat  points  as total  household  resources  increase.
This is done  by Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990b)  and  they  do find  that  with this
modification  a Kuznets  curve  is  possible.
(iii)  In the  children  as  public  goods  model,  departures  from the  Stone-
Geary  utility  function  are likely  to  make the  solution  intractable. An
alternative  is to examine  corner  solutions  of the  Nash game,  as a  way not  only
of possibly  generating  the  Kuznets  curve,  but  also  of rationalizing  policy
concerns  about  the  need to target  incremental  resources  to female  adults.
All three  of these  avenues  hold out  interesting  possibilities  for  further
research.- 16 -
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